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Technocracy, the Market, and the 
Governance of England’s National Health Service  
 
 
Abstract 
England’s publicly-funded National Health Service has become heavily influenced by expert authority 
and the market economy. This has had implications for accountability and for the receptiveness of 
health decisions to stakeholder needs. One response is the introduction of a range of regulatory 
provisions designed to facilitate stakeholder engagement. These provisions are scrutinized using 
three conceptual devices (i.e., core accountability, social reporting, and social learning). It is 
demonstrated that they have significant implications, since they enable technical experts to: form 
closed communities; communicate amongst themselves mainly about economic and financial matters; 
and make decisions that aid the market without meaningful recourse to citizens. While technical 
experts are necessary for helping to manage complex areas, current arrangements reinforce an 
existing gap between economic and democratic values through hardened technocratic approaches to 
health care governance. 
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1. Introduction 
Bringing order and stability to complex areas of public life presents increasing challenges to 
policymakers (Vibert 2007; Burris et al. 2005).  One response has seen ever more regulatory and 
decision-making authority being transferred, by policy communities, to independent experts (Vibert 
2007). While this might bring potential benefits (e.g., decisions might be quicker), expert decision-
making processes are not always comprehensible, and cannot always be properly questioned by 
stakeholders (e.g., citizens), which is a concern when considering crucial decisions can affect the 
welfare of many (Baldwin et al. 2012; Vibert 2007; Feldman and Khademian 2002; Ogus1994). With 
this in mind, a pressing question emerges: Does regulatory governance address the needs of 
stakeholders? 
 
This question is significant in the context of England’s National Health Service (NHS). The NHS is a 
large and complex organization providing publicly-funded health care. It is the fifth largest employer in 
the world (World Economic Forum 2015), dealing with around one million patients every 36 hours 
(Department of Health 2005). It is arguable, given such scale, that more than ever the NHS needs 
experts to manage issues involving, say, new technological risks (Beck 1992), and intricate regulatory 
solutions (Vibert 2007). But it is also arguable that designing solutions should involve experts and 
non-experts. After all, health care personally affects stakeholders, like patients, who are unlikely to be 
involved with managing day-to-day regulatory processes. Furthermore, health care often involves 
mixtures of technical knowledge (e.g., how much resource) and political considerations (e.g., 
allocation of resource) (Prosser 2010; Vincent-Jones 2011; Mullen et al. 2011). Yet, devising solutions 
and formulating an appropriate dialogue across different groups will not be easy. Different actors are 
likely to construct different identities and communicate in different ways (Black 2002). Governments 
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have navigated these problems by creating mechanisms to involve patients and citizens in decisions 
(Horton and Lynch-Wood 2018). 
 
This article focuses on NHS regulation and governance, and particularly how expert authority and the 
market (that is, the space where supply and demand principles operate and where buyers (e.g., 
purchasers of health care services) and sellers (e.g., hospitals) interact (Marshall 2013; Samuelson 
1983)) have been enhanced through regulatory changes. This has had implications for accountability 
and for how receptive health care regulation is to stakeholders’ needs (Horton and Lynch-Wood 
2018). Acknowledging these implications, successive administrations have introduced measures to 
ensure services are accountable and address stakeholder needs. This has been supported by political 
ambitions and expressions, such as putting ‘patients at the heart of the NHS’ (Department of Health 
2010, p. 3). In considering whether the needs of stakeholders are properly addressed, the authors 
scrutinise current stakeholder engagement provisions using three conceptual devices (i.e., core 
accountability, social reporting, and social learning). These devices enable an assessment of the 
degree and quality of interaction and responsiveness between one set of stakeholders (e.g., experts 
like economic regulators) and another (e.g., lay persons like patients). This is important, as there 
might be differences between the economic concerns of, say, economic regulators (e.g., use of scarce 
resources) and the democratic concerns and values of patients (e.g., dialogue over patient needs, 
experiences and decision-making transparency). 
 
The analysis of regulatory provisions shows that the current framework enables technical experts to: 
form closed communities; engage and communicate with each other mainly about economic and 
financial issues; and make critical decisions without meaningful recourse to citizens.  The authors 
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claim existing arrangements give primacy to economic values and financial objectives over social 
interests (e.g., equality). The arrangements are technocratic, making provision for complex tasks and 
activities that are mostly procedural, market-focused (e.g., publishing competition guidance) and 
supportive of market-functioning (e.g., accounting). The article starts by outlining the growth of expert 
authority. Then, it looks at the implications for openness and accountability, and how administrations 
have responded by introducing provisions that modify accountability and promote stakeholder 
engagement. The article then analyzes the existing governance framework using the three conceptual 
devices. It ends with the discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Rise of Expert Authority 
England’s NHS can be divided into five important areas of activity. Each activity, as is now shown, has 
come to be dominated by independent experts (Table 1). Tables 2 to 6 outline the constitution of the 
relevant bodies involved. 
 
The first activity is commissioning. This involves Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) contracting, 
on behalf of patients and within a particular geographical area, with hospitals that provide health 
services. CCGs, which exercise considerable financial autonomy, are comprised of medical doctors, 
known as General Practitioners (GPs), plus a lay member (an individual who is not a CCG member or 
health care professional) and experts in accountancy, nursing and specialist care (The National 
Health Service (Clinical Commissioning Groups) Regulations 2012, Reg. 11–13). As Table 2 shows, 
CCG members are managed and appointed by a non-departmental public body, called NHS England, 
although members can be nominated by existing CCG members. NHS England comprises experts in 
law, statistics, economics and medicine (NHS England 2018a). Its members are appointed by the 
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Secretary of State for the Department of Health as well as the non-executive members of the NHS 
England Board. The establishment of NHS England and CCGs echo previous reforms that 
encouraged distance between government and commissioning authorities for the purposes of creating 
a quasi-market in health care (see Department of Health 2003; National Health Service and 
Community Care Act 1990 (NHSCCA)). 
 
Health care provision is the second activity. It covers services not provided by GPs (e.g., services 
provided by hospital). NHS Foundation Trusts are typical providers for a local area, although these 
bodies operate within a health care market where entry is limited to providers that can meet published 
licensing criteria. Established by the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 
(HSC(CHS)A), NHS Foundation Trusts are provided with a greater degree of economic independence 
than their predecessors (i.e., NHS Trusts established under the NHSCCA). NHS Foundation Trusts 
comprise directors that typically have considerable technical expertise in areas such as medicine and 
finance, although some have professional backgrounds in areas like social work and public relations.i 
Members join through a mix of invitation and application, whereas some figures are appointed (e.g., 
the Chair and non-executive directors must be appointed by a Council of Governors) and elected 
(e.g., the Council of Governors) (Table 3). 
 
Since 1990 the NHS market began steadily to develop. Over time, this prompted the emergence of a 
third area of activity in 2003, which we call economic regulation. An important development was the 
establishment of Monitor, established as an independent economic regulator of health care providers 
(HSC(CHS)A 2003, s 2(1)). As Table 4 shows, Monitor is led by a Chair, who is appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Health. Monitor’s other Board members are appointed by existing non-executive 
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members who have expertise in areas of banking, accountancy and finance (Monitor 2018). Monitor’s 
regulatory powers have recently been strengthened. It is now empowered to issue, set, modify and 
revoke licences and enforce general competition laws.  
 
The fourth activity is consumer championing. This is led by Healthwatch England, a committee located 
inside the Care Quality Commission (CQC) (see below). Healthwatch England has members with both 
technical expertise (e.g., accountancy) and other expertise (e.g., journalism) (Healthwatch England 
2018). As Table 5 shows, members are appointed by the Secretary of State and the Chair. The main 
functions of Healthwatch England are to build a picture of health care across England, to oversee 
Local Healthwatch Organisations (LHOs) (Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA), s 181(2)),ii and to 
provide advice to relevant bodies on the views, needs and experiences of health care users (HSCA 
2012, s 181(4)).iii LHOs are tasked with making the views and experiences of local people known to 
Healthwatch England and commissioners, as well as with promoting and supporting the involvement 
of local people in commissioning and provision and enabling people to monitor and review access to 
local services, choices relating to them, and standards (Local Government and Public Involvement in 
Health Act 2007 (LGPIHA), s 221(2); HSCA, s 182(4)). Composed of local lay (i.e. patient) 
representatives, there are presently 152 LHOs across England. At least one member must sit with 
local authority and CCG members on local partnership forums known as Health and Wellbeing Boards 
(HWB) (HSCA 2012, s 194(e)). 
 
The last activity concerns the regulation of quality (Table 6). This involves two main bodies. The first is 
the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which was established in 1999 (National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (Establishment and Constitution) Order 1999). NICE produces quality 
Page 6 of 46
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standards and practitioner guidance on how treatment should be provided (HSCA 2012, ss 232 and 
233). NICE is staffed with members that have clinical, financial and policy expertise (NICE 2018). 
They are appointed by the Secretary of State and other members. The second body is the CQC, 
which is led by a Chair, appointed by the Secretary of State, who appoints members with clinical and 
financial expertise (CQC 2018). The CQC is mainly responsible for inspecting, investigating and 
prosecuting providers that pose quality and safety concerns.  Note that the CQC has more 
independence than its predecessors, the Commission for Health Improvement and the Commission 
for Social Care Inspection. The CQC was recently given new powers of ‘market oversight’ over social 
care.iv 
 
We should note that the bodies mentioned, like others using public finance, must, for the purposes of 
financial assessment, disclose their accounts to an additional body of technical expert authority: the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).  The CAG oversees public financial reporting in England 
(Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011, s 11) and is responsible for examining the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public bodies (National Audit Act 1983, s 6(1)). The current CAG is a 
former global managing partner of PriceWaterhouseCoopers (National Audit Office 2018). 
 
This has illustrated the rise in independent expertise and a more technocratic approach to NHS 
regulation. For the most part, expert authorities are required to undertake technical tasks (e.g., 
accounting, auditing, health care contracting, regulating competition) that support the market and 
ensure financial prudence. Relevant, too, are the procedures that govern the constitution of the 
bodies considered. With few exceptions (i.e., the constitution of NHS Foundation Trusts; Secretary of 
State’s power to appoint), these procedures create scope for closed communities of experts to form 
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through closed processes of governance. The appointment of expert members is often made by 
existing expert members. Granted, the professional backgrounds of those sitting on these expert 
authorities are diverse, ranging from social work to public relations (Tables 2 to 6). But many of these 
individual professional backgrounds, whilst important, are peripheral to the economic and financial 
focus of many prescribed regulatory tasks. 
 
The article builds on these observations by linking them to the idea that NHS regulatory governance 
creates a gap between economic values and democratic interests and values. Vincent Jones (2011) 
attributes this gap to the privileging of individual choice over democratic voice in healthcare reform. 
We approach this slightly differently. For us, the framework not only creates a gap, but puts in place 
extensive – albeit subtle and not easy to untangle – structures that reinforce it. We find these 
structures to embody a hardened technocratic approach to governance that is market-shaping and 
market-supporting. We now approach this in four stages. The first (section 3) draws on concerns that 
the public’s desire for accountability and openness has become difficult to meet owing to a growth in 
independent expert authority (see Baldwin et al. 2012). The second (section 4) outlines the 
stakeholder engagement measures that have been introduced to meet this desire, but which have 
been criticised as undermining accountability, reducing openness and restricting potential for making 
regulatory decisions with all stakeholders in mind (Horton and Lynch-Wood 2018). The third stage 
(section 5) outlines three key conceptual tools (i.e., core accountability, social reporting and social 
learning) used to analyze current stakeholder engagement arrangements. The fourth stage (section 6) 
uses these tools to help understand existing arrangements. Overall, it is claimed that existing 
stakeholder engagement arrangements aid the health care market through technocratic decision-
making, and reinforce the gap between economic and democratic values. 
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3. Accountability Concerns 
Accountability is the condition of being answerable for past actions. It can, however, take different 
forms. Monitor, for example, can hold health care providers legally accountable for any practices that 
may be regarded and found as anti-competitive. Simultaneously, Monitor can be held politically 
accountable, a process largely reinforced through reports on its performance to the Secretary of State 
and Parliament. To some extent, legal and political accountability reflects a more traditional view of 
accountability, where public institutions are required to explain their conduct to courts, citizens and 
their representatives (Bovens 2007; Scott 2000).  Yet this old view of accountability is said to be 
restricted in its ability to provide a reliable view of how regulatory and public authorities actually 
function (Lodge and Stirton 2012; Vibert 2007; Scott 2000). Indeed, the marketisation of public 
(health) services has been said to fragment accountability (e.g., due to contracting out) (Lodge and 
Stirton 2012; Scott 2000) and regulation now involves informal negotiation, bargaining and 
communication between regulators and regulatees (see Sanderson et al. 2017; Black 2008). This 
suggests traditional mechanisms of accountability are less prominent, and arguably less easy to 
identify. The rise of expert authority has, among other things, certainly meant that the public’s desire 
for accountability and openness is more difficult to meet (Baldwin et al. 2012). What is important to 
note is that policymakers, in recognising accountability concerns, have attempted to modify levels of 
accountability and openness by introducing measures to enhance stakeholder engagement. We more 
consider these in more detail. 
 
4. Governance and stakeholder engagement  
Stakeholder engagement, here seen as mechanisms (e.g., reports, meetings) that encourage relevant 
actors to communicate, share information, and make decisions, has for years been a feature of NHS 
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governance. In recent years, it has become more prominent. Community Health Councils (CHCs) 
were established in 1973. As independent bodies with local patient representatives, CHCs were 
tasked with ensuring health care practice was informed by patients’ views (Porter 1980) and with 
obtaining information from hospitals (Hogg 2007). The workloads of CHCs were later increased, as 
market-based reforms took hold in 1990, and they became less effective as an independent voice 
(Hogg 2007). Public rights to information about standards of local care were introduced shortly after 
(Department of Health 1991) and commitments were made to promote ‘listening’, ‘discussing’, 
‘reporting’ and responsiveness between stakeholders (NHS Management Executive 1992; Cabinet 
Office 1999; Department of Health 2002a). Nevertheless, policies in this area were described as 
ambiguous (Pollock 1992). The marketization of public services and creation of new modes of 
regulation also appeared to produce what some described as a democratic deficit (see Giddens 
1998). Attempting to address this perceived deficit in the NHS, measures were introduced to: enable 
local people to elect NHS Foundation Trust members (Department of Health 2002b); populate 
commissioning authorities with a range of health professionals and lay persons (Department of Health 
2003); and develop clinical standards in collaboration with patients (Department of Health 2002a).  
 
In 2003, CHCs were replaced with Patient and Public Involvement (PPI) Forums. Unlike CHCs, PPI 
Forums were administrated by NHS Trusts, and so tended to be less independent than CHCs. PPI 
Forums were also overseen by an expert body, the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in 
Health (CPPIH) (National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002), but it was 
abolished in 2008. PPI Forums were replaced by LINks (see LGPIHA 2007). Interestingly, LINks held 
no statutory rights to obtain information about health care services and inspect hospitals (Hogg 2007). 
LHOs later replaced LINks (HSCA 2012) and were established against a background of growing 
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expectation that independent expert bodies should appear before Parliamentary select committees 
(Baldwin et al. 2012).  
 
So, there appeared to be a need to further boost accountability in NHS regulation and governance, 
and to empower citizens through greater levels of engagement (Department of Health 2010). But 
opinions have been divided on precisely what these policies and ambitions mean (Horton and Lynch-
Wood 2018). A suggestion is that stakeholder engagement emphasizes patient choice of provider 
rather than patient voice in decision-making (Vincent-Jones 2009, 2011) and forces citizens to trade in 
their dependency on the medical profession for a dependency on the market (e.g., by encouraging 
self-responsibility for health) (Veitch 2010). While measures have been introduced to modify 
stakeholder engagement in the manner described above, these provide only a partial picture of NHS 
regulatory governance. It is important to consider the extensive framework for stakeholder 
engagement that exists (i.e., reporting and non-reporting mechanisms). Crucially, we examine what 
this framework actually does – what it might mean for practical actions. To do this, we use three 
conceptual devices, which we briefly outline. 
 
5. Conceptual Devices 
There are other ways of analyzing the existing stakeholder engagement framework. It could be 
explored from a legitimacy perspective, and whether experts have proper justification for their roles 
and decisions. We have chosen the following three devices, since we want to consider whether and 
how a disparate and complex set of provisions can operate coherently and secure important 
stakeholder needs. 
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Core Accountability 
Bovens (2007) says core accountability relates to the relationship between one actor (accountor) and 
another actor (accountee), and the obligation of the former to explain and justify conduct to the latter. 
While core accountability is relevant to concerns that exist over whether an actor’s conduct is visible 
to a relevant population (see Baldwin et al. 2012), it goes to the heart of how conduct is explained or 
justified. Core accountability, for instance, is central to whether actions and decisions are explained 
either financially or procedurally (see Ogus 1994) or whether conduct is made the subject of 
information that is accessible to stakeholders, open to critique, and released in a timely manner 
(Bovens 2010). What is notable is that core accountability can provide a benchmark against which 
regulatory provisions generally can be analyzed, as it emphasises some specific activities (e.g., 
explaining conduct, positing probing questions). 
 
Social Reporting 
A widely used regulatory mechanism, reporting is a process for measuring, recording and disclosing 
information (Hess 1999, 2008). NHS bodies and stakeholders must report on many aspects of their 
work. The concept of social reporting is designed to stimulate a culture of exchange and feedback 
between stakeholders, yet specifically to encourage identification of stakeholder values. The idea, 
among other things, is to promote greater organizational reflexivity by exposing reporting bodies to 
the gaze and assessment of their primary and secondary stakeholders (see Pruzan 1997). Social 
reporting is thought to lead to greater levels of accountability and stakeholder democracy, and 
practices that are more consistent with social needs (Hess 2008). Social reporting and core 
accountability are potentially mutually reinforcing, for both might involve accounting or providing 
explanations and justifications for socially-beneficial actions. 
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Social Learning 
Social learning refers to the development of stakeholder capacities and competencies to deliberate 
and reflect on matters of public importance. Vincent Jones (2011) identifies three types of social 
learning, contending that each provides necessary albeit insufficient conditions for reflexive 
governance. The first is derived from neo-institutional economics. This posits that improvements in 
public services may be achieved by overcoming the problems of monopoly power and incentivizing 
actors to make responsive decisions. The second is built on democratic exchange via the facilitation 
of dialogue, counter-argument and dissent (e.g., ongoing consultations on approvals for changes in 
services). And the third form is founded on pragmatism. This facilitates joint enquiry, forward planning, 
transparent problem-solving (e.g., benchmarking, internal reflection), acting on information, and 
adaptation of decision-making procedures and practices. 
 
These conceptual devices are not mutually exclusive. Without, say, relevant explanations of past 
conduct (core accountability), or dialogue and feedback mechanisms (social reporting), the potential 
for social learning is impeded.  Crucially, core accountability, social reporting and social learning 
provide the institutional conditions that are important for bridging the gap between economic values 
(e.g., efficiency) and democratic interests and values (e.g., meaningful exchange between the public 
and experts about patient needs). Using these tools, we now explore the existing framework. 
 
6. Stakeholder Engagement 
There are two parts to this analysis. The first examines the stakeholder engagement activity of 
reporting, while the second examines non-reporting activities (e.g., consultations, meetings and 
advice). 
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Reporting 
Tables 7 to 11 summarise the different reporting duties undertaken by key bodies. The Tables and 
analysis are organized using three questions derived from the conceptual devices. The first question 
is: does the regulatory framework specify the report’s substance? This is relevant as a governance 
provision specifying substance is one that might facilitate explanations of conduct (core 
accountability) and the identification of important stakeholder values (e.g., equality) relevant to that 
conduct (social reporting). The second question is: to which parties must the report be presented? 
This is important since a provision specifying the recipients is one that can enable explanations of 
conduct to be distributed to relevant stakeholders (core accountability), aid dialogue between 
interested actors (social reporting) and enable stakeholders to learn about this conduct and build their 
learning capacities for the purposes of making judgements and decisions (social learning). The third 
question is: are the report’s recipients required to respond?  Again, this is important as the reporter 
might actually receive feedback from the reportee (social reporting), which can enable the reporter to 
learn of the reportee’s concerns (social learning) and meet requests for any further information (core 
accountability). For purposes of analysis, these areas have been broken down in to substance, target 
addressee, and reaction. 
 
Substance 
The CQC is unique. It is the only expert body across the areas reviewed that is expressly required to 
report on ‘regulated activities’ as well as disclose the steps taken to involve patients in discussions 
about health care provision (Table 11). ‘Regulated activities’ are vaguely defined as involving, or being 
connected with, health or social care provision (HSCA 2008, s 8). This does not mean that those not 
expressly required by the legislation to disclose their regulated activities are closed off from scrutiny. 
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All expert bodies – including the CQC – have annual reporting duties. But these duties are limited to 
disclosing ‘how’ functions and duties are discharged. As the emphasis on ‘how’ suggests, it is the 
methods these bodies use to make decisions and conduct their activities that must be disclosed. The 
core duty of the annual report makes no reference to the substance of decisions and activities. These 
bodies only have to report on ‘how’ they do what they do, which may have significant implications for 
the types of information that is released (see Horton and Lynch-Wood 2018). 
 
As a separate yet related matter, all expert bodies reviewed, while not having an annual duty to report 
on the substance of past conduct and activities, do have specific duties to report on certain activities 
that we can define as regulatory. As is illustrated in Tables 7, 8 and 9, there are specific duties placed 
on bodies like NHS England, Monitor and NHS Foundation Trusts. NHS England must publish a 
response to its consultation regarding CCG dissolution. This is important since CCG dissolution might 
impact on the degree to which local populations access health care services (NHS England 2016). 
Also, Monitor must publish its assessment of likely significant impacts on health services caused by its 
activities (such as, major changes to standard license conditions). As for NHS Foundation Trusts, they 
are required to report annually on matters of performance, director’s pay, and finances (Table 8). 
These reporting duties promote transparency on these matters but the substance of what must be 
reported on here could be described as narrowly focused and vague (e.g., meaning of ‘performance’). 
By contrast, most annual reporting duties across the majority of areas of activity require the disclosure 
of a broader range of matters (i.e., how functions and duties have been discharged). But as 
highlighted already, this annual reporting mechanism does not mandate the disclosure of past conduct 
and activities. This suggests that, when it comes to identifying important democratic interests and 
values, there are potential weaknesses in the existing provisions, particularly when they are explored 
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through the lens of our three conceptual tools. For instance, existing provisions obligate the disclosure 
of information about procedural affairs, primarily. It is therefore arguable that core accountability is 
constrained due to limitations placed on expert bodies to explain their conduct, to justify it, address 
probing questions from stakeholders (i.e., local citizens) and enter into dialogue with them on issues 
that go beyond those matters required to be disclosed. This, then, shows restricted potential for social 
reporting, for the reporting mechanisms do not tend to stimulate a culture of exchange and feedback 
between stakeholders, and, moreover, they are not concerned with encouraging the identification of 
important social interests, such as decision-making transparency. With both core accountability and 
social reporting limited in this way, the potential for social learning seems also constrained. For social 
needs and concerns (e.g., equality and access to care) to be identified by all relevant stakeholders, 
exchanges, deliberations and feedback mechanisms between experts and other stakeholders 
(particularly those to whom the reporting content relates (e.g., service-users) must relate to matters 
beyond those that are technical and procedural. Indeed, such issues often cannot be separated from 
considerations which non-experts (e.g., service-users) are able to draw on using their distinct 
experience (Vincent-Jones 2011). 
 
Developing this point, the reporting framework in all areas of functioning is configured, primarily 
(though not solely), to support the coordination of technical activities that aid the market. Tables 7 to 
11 give numerous examples, but they include accounting, competition law enforcement, tariffs, 
inspections, payments, price modifications and license conditions. Of course, some provisions require 
disclosures that refer to actions taken to reduce inequality (see Table 7) and promote public 
involvement (see Tables 7 and 11). They are exceptions. When drawn together as a coherent whole, 
the reporting provisions focus mainly on technical and market-oriented matters. 
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Addressee 
The governance framework, in many cases, expressly states that information has to be transferred 
from one named expert body to another. The Tables suggest there is little deliberation and 
collaboration provided for between experts and the lay community, indicating there is little by way of 
explanation of conduct between important stakeholder groups and therefore restricted opportunities 
for some stakeholders to learn about, and understand, the needs of other stakeholders. So, Table 7 
indicates most reporting activities in the area of commissioning take place between expert bodies (i.e., 
NHS England and CCGs). Again, by way of example, Table 7 shows that NHS England is required to 
direct its commissioning guidance reports to Healthwatch England. Likewise, Monitor is generally 
required to direct its reports to other expert bodies, such as NHS England, the CQC, and the CMA 
(see Table 9), while Monitor itself is an expert addressee of disclosures made by NHS Foundation 
Trusts (see Table 8). It can also be seen that Monitor must send its notice to modify licence conditions 
to Healthwatch England (see Table 8), that the CQC must report on inspections to persons carrying 
out regulated activities (e.g., hospitals), and that NICE is required to disclose information to the CAG 
(Table 11). As a final illustration, Table 11 shows that the CQC is required to report information to, for 
example, inspectors and other persons carrying out regulated activities. 
 
We are trying to show that most reporting activity is conducted between expert bodies. There are 
exceptions, of course. As Tables 7 to 11 demonstrate, many reports have no specified audience. And 
while some reports are required to be directed to certain non-expert audiences (i.e., Secretary of 
State, Parliament and local authorities), the crucial point to note is that LHOs are specified as a target 
audience for a predominantly expert body (i.e., Healthwatch England) on two occasions (Table 10). 
Now, as statutorily-created groups of local patient and public representatives, LHOs are a potential 
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source of intelligence and information about local needs over health care services for many expert 
authorities. The fact that the governance framework does not specify LHOs (and for that matter 
service users and the public generally) as a target audience for most other reports, and indeed as 
actors who question expert authorities, judge their past conduct, deliberate problems and participate 
in crucial decisions with them suggests patients and citizens, as key stakeholders, are not afforded 
meaningful opportunities to engage. 
 
It is appropriate to consider briefly the different publication requirements (Tables 7 to 11). A 
requirement to publish a report only has meaning if there is an expectation that it is to be accessed 
and read by someone (i.e., potential recipient). It is interesting that the word ‘publication’ is not defined 
in statute. A publication can therefore be as broad or narrow as the reporting body desires. However, 
it could be argued that the requirement for certain bodies (e.g., Monitor) to present their annual 
reports to Parliament is one of the more robust forms of publication. Indeed these reports are usually 
published as Parliamentary papers, customarily. But questions remain over the accessibility and 
relevance of publications to lay persons affected by NHS delivery since existing reporting 
arrangements do not expressly target the latter. 
 
Reaction 
Critical to the conceptual tools is the ability of those stakeholders targeted for engagement to respond 
in some way. Response mechanisms are essential so that questions can be asked and information 
elicited (core accountability) and so that collaboration can occur for the purposes of identifying needs 
and planning future activities (social reporting and social learning). Interestingly, current stakeholder 
engagement provisions impose only a limited number of requirements on target addressees to react 
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or respond. They primarily involve engagement between commissioning authorities (Table 7), 
competition authorities (Table 9), and other expert bodies (e.g., CQC) and the CAG (see Table 11).  
Particularly interesting when we consider issues around reaction are the reporting requirements that 
relate to LHOs. LHOs do of course have to report annually to NHS England, CCGs and the CQC. But 
there is no requirement for these latter bodies to engage LHOs in response - that is, there is no 
requirement for reaction, reciprocation, exchange and dialogue to occur between experts and non-
experts, thus potentially undermining notions of core accountability, social reporting and social 
learning. 
 
6.2. Non-reporting 
This part of the analysis focuses on the requirements for stakeholders to engage in activities that do 
not involve reporting (Tables 12 to 15). Non-reporting activities can generally be divided into meetings, 
consultations, advice, assistance, guidance and recommendations. Again, we have questions to 
underpin the analysis that are derived from the conceptual tools highlighted. The first question is: what 
is the substance of non-reporting activities? Like the substance of reporting, this is important as it 
might facilitate a judgement on how effective it is at providing opportunities for explaining conduct 
(core accountability) and enabling dialogue about stakeholder needs (social learning). The second 
question is: which audience does the mechanism target? The answer to this question will help to 
reach a conclusion about the extent to which the mechanism provides a basis for dialogue, exchange 
and questioning (core accountability) to occur between certain stakeholders (i.e., experts and 
citizens). The third question is: are target audiences provided with meaningful engagement 
opportunities? The answer to this may help determine whether and how non-reporting mechanisms 
stimulate ongoing dialogue between stakeholders (i.e., experts and non-experts), and the degree to 
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which those most affected by decisions (i.e., non-expert citizens) are provided with opportunities to 
scrutinise, question, elicit information from and pass judgement on experts for the purposes of core 
accountability and social learning. Again, we have broken these questions down into substance, 
target addressee, and engagement opportunity. 
 
Substance 
Several bodies reviewed are, subject to confidentiality and public interest considerations, required to 
hold publicly-accessible meetings on matters typically relating to their functions (Tables 12 to 15). 
Again, when considering duties on expert bodies to consult, the substance underpinning these 
consultation duties largely depends on the functions of the body carrying out the consultation. For 
instance, CCGs and NHS England must consult on commissioning matters (Table 12), while Monitor 
must consult on competition matters (Table 13). The NICE and CQC must, with some exceptions, 
consult on health care quality matters (Table 15). We must be mindful, however, that there are 
limitations placed on the substance of consultations in a number of key areas affecting service-users. 
As Table 15 shows, NICE is under a duty to consult the public when preparing quality standards and 
when establishing procedures for preparing such standards. We need to stress that it is the methods 
(i.e., preparation and procedures) these bodies use to devise quality standards that form the basis of 
the duty. That is, the duty to consult makes no reference to important considerations that go beyond 
the preparation of quality standards and beyond the establishment of procedures for setting them 
(e.g., conformity of health services with current clinical knowledge). Service-users and the public have 
an interest in learning about these considerations. However, by limiting NICE’s duty to consult in this 
way, no clear opportunities to engage the public on matters of substance are being provided. In terms 
our analysis, this suggests there is limited scope to raise questions of, elicit information about, and 
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pass judgement on, important issues that go beyond the preparation of quality standards and the 
establishment of procedures for setting them (core accountability). Indeed, both core accountability 
and social learning are potentially undermined here, as extant provisions allow for the exclusion of 
values and interests held by the public on these matters, preventing them from informing the 
adaptation of procedures and decision making through questioning and dialogue. 
 
Interestingly, in the area of consumer championing, expert authorities are not required to engage 
LHOs in any capacity. An exception, however, is Healthwatch England’s duty to advise and assist 
LHOs on the latter’s contractual arrangements with local authorities and on how (i.e., procedures) 
LHOs should carry on their prescribed activities (Table 14). Crucially, this shows the role and status of 
LHOs to be mostly circumscribed. Not only do they lack a formal relationship with CCGs (Tritter 
2013), LHOs are afforded limited opportunities to meaningfully enter into exchanges with expert 
authorities on matters beyond contractual arrangements and how they carry on their prescribed 
activities, and inform regulatory decision-making with the values and concerns of their representees. 
 
Addressee 
The sole target for publicly-accessible meetings of expert bodies in all of the areas reviewed, are the 
members of these bodies. Interestingly, the public has to target these bodies by attending the meeting 
if they so wish (Horton and Lynch-Wood 2018). Looking at consultations, Monitor’s duties to consult 
are targeted at other expert bodies (e.g., NHS England) and are concerned with matters relating to 
economic regulation (see Table 13). In other words, there is no formal opportunity for non-experts to 
learn, or voice their concerns, about how economic regulation may affect them (e.g., issues around 
the financial health of a local hospital). Similarly, Table 15 shows that, in addition to the Secretary of 
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State, the CQC must primarily consult NHS England and inspectors (that is, experts) on a range of 
matters, such as confidential information handling and inspection frameworks. And while consultations 
on the part of the CQC on how it will regard the views of service users can be commended, it is 
slightly troubling that extant governance frameworks are vague in terms of who might be the relevant 
target audience. This is because, as Table 15 shows, the reference is to appropriate persons. We can 
contrast the NICE, which is under a duty to consult appropriate persons and the public on preparing 
quality standards and establishing procedures for creating these standards. While this shows some 
level of broad engagement, we have seen above how NICE’s duty to consult on these matters, which 
is largely to do with preparatory measures and procedural issues, limits the scope for these 
stakeholders to ask questions, elicit information, pass judgement and enter into ongoing exchange. 
What these points suggest is that the governance framework – when analyzed from a core 
accountability and social learning perspective – is piecemeal and haphazard. For instance, although 
the CQC’s duty to consult on a broad range of matters may enhance the potential for accountability 
and learning, the narrow target audience (i.e., experts) may act as a constraining factor. Similarly, the 
broad target audience associated with NICE’s duty to consult (i.e., the public) is closely aligned with 
the aforementioned two conceptual tools, while its limited remit (e.g., confining consultation to the 
establishment of procedures, and not actions, conduct and decision making) is not. 
 
Engagement Opportunity 
In relation to the publicly-accessible meetings of expert bodies (see Tables 12 to 15), it can be seen 
that members of the public may be refused access for ‘special reasons’ (National Health Service Act 
2006 (NHSA), Schedule 7, para. 13(2)) and do not have a specific entitlement to ask questions and 
elicit information from members. As has been suggested earlier, such entitlements are essential for 
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social needs to be identified and for the exchange of ideas to occur between stakeholders. Such 
exchange is a cornerstone of accountability and social learning. Table 12 shows that NHS England 
and CCGs must make arrangements to involve the public on commissioning matters whether by 
consultation ‘or’ providing information ‘or’ using other ways. The reference to ‘or’ appears both critical 
and deliberate, since it allows expert bodies to limit the scope for proper deliberation and 
engagementbetween experts and the public. This potentially undermines judicial consultation 
standards (i.e., opportunities for comment).v Arrangements, then, do not prevent sole reliance on non-
consultative methods, such as surveys (see NHS England 2018b), despite such methods being 
questionable in their ability to secure the ongoing dialogue, exchange and questioning needed to 
facilitate core accountability and social learning, especially in the deliberative and pragmatic sense. 
 
Finally, the area of consumer championing does not have incorporated into it any meaningful 
feedback features. As Table 14 illustrates, Healthwatch England must receive from LHOs advice and 
assistance on several matters that trigger a duty for Healthwatch England to react by engaging expert 
bodies mainly (i.e., Monitor, NHS England and the CQC), some political bodies (i.e., Secretary of 
State and local authorities), but not LHOs, service-users or the public. Interestingly, these bodies have 
a duty to respond to Healthwatch England only, in writing. There is, then, some reciprocity. LHOs are 
not, however, supported to the same extent. Healthwatch England must advise and assist LHOs, but 
only in relation to how the latter carry on their activities and discharge their contractual obligations to 
local authorities. Opportunities for LHOs to respond and engage are not specified.  This suggests that 
engagement opportunities for LHOs to raise concerns with Healthwatch England that go beyond how 
LHO activities are carried out (i.e., procedural issues), and respond to Healthwatch England’s advice 
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and assistance through questioning (core accountability) and collaboration (social learning), are 
limited. 
 
7. Discussion 
Current provisions appear to lack alignment to ideas of core accountability, social reporting and social 
learning. Our broader concern is what this says about the nature and purpose of NHS governance. As 
constructed, the provisions provide opportunities for experts to engage predominantly with each other, 
share technical knowledge, and share common interests on the health care market, how it functions, 
and the technical competences of those supporting it. Drawing from Vibert (2007), the framework 
provides scope for the creation of closed epistemic communities that interact on issues primarily 
concerning economic, procedural and financial affairs. This is seen in Monitor’s duties to report to the 
CMA and NHS England about market investigations and financial levies, respectively. It is seen in 
Monitor’s requirement to: issue guidance to CCGs about the National Tariff rules; issue notices to 
providers and CCGs of proposals to modify licences; and to engage the CMA about how competition 
should be regulated. On commissioning, CCGs and NHS England are required to engage each other 
mainly on decisions over commissioning matters and CCG dissolution. NHS England must engage 
with other experts (e.g., itself, in Board meetings, and the CAG) over technical matters relating to 
commissioning and finances, respectively. The NICE is required to disclose its accounts to the CAG, 
provide advice on health care quality to NHS England for commissioning purposes and publish quality 
standards for health care providers to follow. Likewise, the CQC must engage the CAG, inspectors 
and itself in Board meetings. A mixture of bodies is required to do a mixture of things, but the common 
thread is that there tend to be requirements on expert bodies to communicate about the market and 
the ability of expert bodies to undertake tasks supporting it. 
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Where governance arrangements provide for non-experts (i.e., LHOs) to advise and assist bodies 
composed predominantly with technical experts (i.e., Healthwatch England and commissioners), we 
see that a series of subsequent engagement channels are provided for, in response, that involve 
expert bodies only. Indeed, more broadly, where experts (e.g., regulators) are required to consult with 
the public, service-users or with bodies on which lay members sit, we have shown that the scope to 
interact on crucial matters of social importance, is limited. 
 
Not only has the rise of technical expertise and the market been facilitated by a transfer of authority 
away from the policy-making arena, our analysis shows that this is being affected in subtle ways by 
extensive and disparate regulatory provisions. These provisions create a framework around which 
closed epistemic worlds of technical knowledge and information-sharing can form and which limits 
input from non-experts. It is a technocratic framework: one that places independent expert authority in 
formal relationships of engagement that primarily serve to overcome the potential problems of 
monopoly power through compliance with complex legal rules (see Davies 2013), externalities, limited 
consumer choice, financial competency and financial prudence. 
 
While technical expertise is now a critical feature of regulation, the public's desire for accountability 
and openness may be difficult to meet if expertise becomes too dominant (Baldwin et al. 2012). We 
show that NHS governance reinforces a narrow, albeit familiar economic approach to decision-making 
and social learning (Vincent-Jones 2011). We also show that this is being achieved through 
arrangements that emphasise technocracy and market functioning. Such arrangements, like neo-
institutional economic approaches to social learning, are – to some measure – necessary to help 
Page 25 of 46
Regulation and Governance
Regulation and Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
26 
 
close the gap between economic and democratic values. But, they are not necessarily sufficient, in 
and of themselves, for closing it. Other approaches (e.g., pragmatic social learning) may be needed. 
But existing regulatory and governance frameworks, and the political thinking informing them, would 
need reviewing and overhauling significantly for this to happen. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We began by asking whether regulatory governance addresses the needs of all stakeholders. 
Arguably, it does not. We see a picture of governance that is closed, expert-led, market-focused, and 
not responsive to those most affected by decisions. Our view then is that governance does not 
properly institute social learning. If social learning strategies were to be instituted, this would require 
resources to be carefully managed due to competing claims on the way those resources are allocated 
(Vincent-Jones 2011). It would also require regulatory reform. In the end, we have drawn attention to 
what is an extensive set of provisions – underpinned by policy ambitions to meet the needs of all 
stakeholders – that represent something significant when analyzed together. We see a deliberate, 
curious, concealed and important picture of regulatory governance. It consolidates technocracy and 
the market, and raises new questions regarding the purpose of regulatory governance in crucial areas 
of public life. 
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ENDNOTES 
i The NHS Foundation Trust Directory 2018 lists all NHS Foundation Trust websites. These websites 
host relevant information on the professional backgrounds of all Trust directors.  
ii Inserting Schedule 1, para. 6(1A) and (1B) of the HSCA 2008. 
iii Inserting s 45A(5) of the HSCA 2008. 
iv Care Act 2014, ss 53–57; The Care and Support (Market Oversight Criteria) Regulations 2015 (SI 
2015/314), Reg 3. 
v R (Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council [2014] UKSC 56. 
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Table 1 Overview of NHS regulation 
Type of activity Relevant bodies Overview of tasks 
Commissioning 
 
 
 
Health care provision 
 
Economic regulation 
 
 
 
Health care quality regulation  
 
 
 
Consumer championing 
NHS England 
 
CCG 
 
NHS Foundation Trusts; private providers 
 
Monitor 
 
CMA 
 
CQC 
 
NICE 
 
Healthwatch England 
CCG oversight 
 
Contracting for health care services 
 
Contracting to provide health care services 
 
Regulating competition 
 
Investigating anti-competitive conduct 
 
Inspection and prosecution 
 
Devising quality standards  
 
Providing advice and information  
CAG, Comptroller and Auditor General; CCG, Clinical Commissioning Groups; CMA, Competition and Markets Authority; CQC, Care Quality 
Commission; HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; Local Healthwatch Organisations; NHS, National Health Service; NICE, National Institute of Health 
and Care Excellence. 
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Table 2 Constitution of expert authority (commissioning) 
Body Method of constitution  Entities involved in and/or responsible for constitution 
CCG 
 
NHS England 
Nomination and appointment  
 
Appointment and consent 
CCG; social services; NHS England 
 
SoS; non-executive members  
Constitution procedure governed by The National Health Service (Clinical Commissioning Groups) Regulations 2012, Reg. 11–13 and The National 
Health Service Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups (Responsibilities and Standing Rules) Regulations 2012, Reg. 24. NHS 
England appointment procedure governed by NHSA 2006, Schedule A1, paras 2–3, as added by Schedule 1 of the HSCA 2012. CCG, Clinical 
Commissioning Group; NHS, National Health Service; NHSA, National Health Service Act; HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; SoS, Secretary of 
State. 
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Table 3 Constitution of expert authority (health care provision) 
Body Method of constitution  Entities involved in and/or responsible for constitution 
NHS Foundation 
Trusts 
Invitation; application; eligibility; election; appointment; 
approval 
Individuals; constituents; a qualifying local authority; a 
relevant university; CoG members; non-executive 
directors; committee of the chairman, chief-executive 
and non-executive directors  
Constitution procedure governed by NHSA 2006, Schedule 7, paras. 6–10 and 17. CoG, Council of Governors; NHS, National Health Service; 
NHSA, National Health Service Act. 
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Table 4 Constitution of expert authority (economic regulation) 
Body Method of constitution  Entities involved in and/or responsible for constitution 
Monitor Appointment and consent SoS; non-executive members 
Constitution procedure governed by HSCA 2012, Schedule 8, paras. 1–2.  HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; NHS, National Health Service; SoS, 
Secretary of State. 
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Table 6 Constitution of expert authority (health care quality regulation) 
Body Method of constitution  Entities involved in and/or responsible for constitution 
CQC 
 
NICE 
Appointment 
 
Appointment and approval 
SoS; non-executive members  
 
SoS; non-executive members 
Constitution procedure governed by HSCA 2008, Schedule 1, paras. 3 and 3A as amended by ss 88 and 89 of the Care Act 2014; The Care Quality 
Commission (Membership) Regulations 2015, Reg. 3; and HSCA 2012, Schedule 16, para. 1–2. CQC, Care Quality Commission; HSCA, Health and 
Social Care Act; NHS, National Health Service; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; SoS, Secretary of State. 
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Table 7 Reporting activities (commissioning) 
Body Format Substance Addressee Publication Reaction 
CCG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NHS England 
Plan 
 
 
 
 
Document 
 
 
Annual 
Report and 
Accounts 
 
 
Papers 
 
 
Annual 
Report 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
Accounts 
 
 
Report 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
Business 
Plan 
 
 
 
Guidance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement 
and notice 
How functions/duties will: be 
exercised; improve services; 
reduce inequalities; involve 
public 
 
Revisions to the plan 
 
 
How functions/duties have 
been exercised; contribution to 
delivery of joint health and 
wellbeing strategy 
 
Matters relating to meetings 
 
 
How functions/duties have 
been effectively discharged; 
extent to which: objectives in 
mandate met; business plan 
proposals given effect 
 
Finances 
 
 
 
CCG performance assessment 
 
Response to consulta ion on 
CCG dissolution 
 
 
 
How functions/duties: will be 
exercised; will improve service 
quality and safety; reduce 
inequalities; involve public 
 
Planning; public involvement in 
planning; involving service-
users in  care-related 
decisions, treatment, diagnosis, 
prevention; payments to 
providers; CCG dissolution; 
safety; discharge of CCG 
functions; obtaining expert 
advice by CCGs; patient 
information processing 
 
Whether objectives of TSA’s 
report achievable; reasons for 
not providing a statement  on 
whether TSA objectives 
achievable 
NHS England; 
HWB 
 
 
 
NHS England; 
HWB 
 
NHS England 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Parliament; SoS 
 
 
 
 
 
SoS; CAG 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
CCG; local 
authority; 
‘appropriate 
persons’ 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
CCGs; 
Healthwatch 
England; 
registered 
persons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliament 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes, unless not in 
the public interest 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
HWB may give NHS 
England its opinion on 
the matter, but CCG 
must be sent a copy  
 
Not specified 
 
 
CAG may examine 
accounts 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
SoS must send letter to 
NHS England on NHS 
England’s performance 
 
 
 
CAG to examine 
accounts and lay before 
Parliament 
 
Not specified  
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
Reporting activities governed by: HSCA 2012, ss 23 (inserting ss 13S(1), 13T and 13U of the NHSA 2006), 26 (inserting ss 14W(2), 14Z2(4), 
14Z8(1), 14Z11, 14Z12, 14Z13(4)–(6), 14Z14 14Z15(1), (5) and (6), 14Z16(6), 14Z22(3) of the NHSA 2006), Schedule 1, para. 16 (inserting 
Schedule A1 of the NHSA 2006) and Schedule 2, para. 17(6)–(7); NHSA 2006, s 65F(5) and (6); The National Health Service (Clinical 
Commissioning Groups) Regulations 2012, Reg. 16(1). CAG, Comptroller and Auditor General; CCG, Clinical Commissioning Groups; HSCA, 
Health and Social Care Act; HWB, Health and Wellbeing Board; NHS, National Health Service; NHSA, National Health Service Act; SoS, Secretary 
of State; TSA, Trust special administration. 
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Table 8 Reporting activities (health care provision) 
Body Format Substance Addressee Publication Reaction 
NHS Foundation 
Trusts 
Annual Report,  
 
 
Accounts and 
any auditor’s 
report 
 
 
 
Document 
Performance, Director’s pay, 
remuneration, expenses  
 
Finances  
 
 
 
 
 
Information relating to forward-planning, 
having regard to the views of the CoG 
Monitor 
 
 
Monitor; 
auditor; 
Parliament 
 
 
 
Monitor 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
Not specified 
 
 
Auditor to carry out audit; 
Monitor to send 
consolidated accounts to 
the CAG. CAG must 
examine accounts  
 
Not specified 
Reporting activities governed by HSCA 2012, ss 154(4) and (8) (inserting Schedule 7, paras. 24(1A) and (4A) of the NHSA 2006), 156(1) (inserting 
Schedule 7, para. 26(2)(ab) and (ac) of the NHSA 2006), Schedule 8. para. 17 and NHSA 2006, Schedule 7, paras. 25(4) and (4A) (as amended by 
s 154(7) of the HSCA 2012) and 27. CoG, Council of Governors; HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; NHSA, National Health Service; NHSA, 
National Health Service Act; 
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Table 9  Reporting activities (economic regulation) 
Body Format Substance Addressee Publication Reaction 
Monitor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual Report  
 
 
 
 
Annual 
Accounts 
 
 
Document 
 
Notice 
 
 
 
 
Notice 
 
 
Notice 
 
 
Notice 
 
 
 
Reference; 
Notice; 
Information 
 
Register; 
Licences  
 
Guidance 
 
Guidance 
 
 
Guidance 
 
 
Statement 
 
 
 
Assessment; 
statement 
 
Notification 
 
 
Notification 
How functions have been 
discharged, aims promoted, 
conflicts in functions resolved, 
enforcement action  
  
Finances 
 
 
 
National Tariff 
 
Imposition of financial levies  
 
 
 
 
Consultation on proposals for 
National Tariff 
 
Decisions on local price 
modifications 
 
Actions to modify conditions;  
inclusion of special conditions 
 
 
Investigations; changes made 
to references for investigation  
 
 
Licensees; standard licence 
conditions 
 
Trust administration criteria  
 
Discretionary requirements; 
enforcement undertakings  
 
National Tariff rules; price and 
service variations 
 
How conflicting duties 
resolved; actions to review 
functions/burdens 
 
Significant impacts 
 
 
Significant service risks; local 
price modifications 
 
Enforcement action taken 
SoS; Parliament  
 
 
 
 
SoS; CAG 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
SoS; NHS England; 
potentially liable 
provider; CQC; 
appropriate persons 
 
CCGs; providers; 
appropriate persons 
 
SoS; providers; CCGs; 
appropriate persons 
 
Licencees; SoS; NHS 
England; CCGs; CQC; 
Healthwatch England 
 
CMA; relevant 
persons 
 
 
Register available for 
inspection  
 
CCGs  
 
Not specified 
 
 
CCGs 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
NHS England; CCGs 
 
 
NHS England; CCGs; 
those who exercise 
relevant regulatory 
functions 
No 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
CAG must examine accounts 
and lay copies before 
Parliament  
 
Not specified 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Report and investigation by 
CMA 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
CCGs to refer to TSA guidance  
 
Not specified 
 
 
Have regard to guidance 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
Reporting activities governed by HSCA 2012, ss 67(4), (8), 68(4), 69(4), 93(1) and (3), 94(1), 95(2) and (3), 99(3) and (4), 100(2) and (3), 108(1)–
(2), 109(1), 110(1), 116(1), (2) and (7), 118(1) and (2), 125(6)–(7), 141(3)–(4), 175(1) (inserting s 65DA(4)(c) of the NHSA 2006); Schedule 8, paras. 
17(1), (4) and (7), 19(2)–(3) and 21 and Schedule 10, para. 1, 3, 4 and 6. CAG, Comptroller and Auditor General; CCG, Clinical Commissioning 
Groups; CMA, Competition and Markets Authority; CQC, Care Quality Commission; HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; Local Healthwatch 
Organisations; NHS, National Health Service; SoS, Secretary of State; TSA, Trust special administration.                                                                                                                             
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Table 10 Reporting activities (consumer championing) 
Body Format Substance Addressee Publication Reaction 
LHOs 
 
 
 
 
Healthwatch 
England 
 
 
Annual 
Report 
 
 
 
Annual 
Report 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other 
reports 
Activities of the organisation; 
such matters as the SoS may 
direct; spending 
 
 
How functions have been 
exercised 
 
The views of people who use 
health services and the needs 
and experiences of the public; the 
views of LHOs on the standard of 
provision and whether or how the 
standard could be improved 
 
Matters relating to health care, as 
appropriate 
NHS England; CCG; CQC; 
Healthwatch England; local 
authority; local authority 
scrutiny committee 
 
Parliament; 
SoS; LHOs 
 
SoS; LHOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
Must be made 
publicly available 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
Reporting activities governed by HSCA 2012, s 181(4) (inserting ss 45A(5) and (6) and 45C(1)–(3) of the HSCA 2008); s 227(2)–(4) of the LGPIHA 
2007 (amended by s 187 of the HSCA 2012). CCG, Clinical Commissioning Groups; CQC, Care Quality Commission; HSCA, Health and Social 
Care Act; LGPIHA, Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act; LHO, Local Healthwatch Organisations; NHS, National Health Service; 
SoS, Secretary of State. 
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Table 12 Non-reporting activities (commissioning) 
Body Format Substance Addressee Engagement opportunity 
CCG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NHS England 
 
 
 
 
 
Meeting 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
Involvement 
 
 
Involvement 
 
Promotion of 
involvement of 
service-users 
 
Consultation “or in 
other ways” 
 
 
Advice 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
“or in other ways” 
 
 
Meeting 
 
 
 
Advice 
Commissioning; presenting annual report 
(meetings closed to the public if substance is 
confidential or prejudicial to the public interest) 
 
Planning; how plans take account of health and 
wellbeing strategy; enabling summaries of views 
about plans; explaining how views taken into 
account; reviewing CCG contribution to delivery 
of joint health and wellbeing strategy 
 
Assessing relevant needs 
 
Preparation of strategy to meet relevant needs 
 
 
Preparation of commissioning plans 
 
Preventing illness; diagnosis of illness 
 
 
 
Involvement in: planning; development and 
consideration of proposals/decisions regarding 
changes 
 
Obtaining professional expert advice 
 
Varying CCG’s constitution; guidance relating to 
discharge of CCG functions; CCG contribution to 
joint health and wellbeing strategy; CCG 
dissolution 
 
Involvement in: planning; development and 
consideration of proposals/decisions regarding 
changes 
 
Commissioning (meetings closed to the public if 
substance is confidential or prejudicial to the 
public interest) 
 
Service safety 
CCG members, but 
meetings are publicly 
accessible 
 
HWB; recipients of 
primary care in a CCG’s 
area  
 
 
 
Appropriate persons 
 
LHOs; people who live 
and work in the area;  
 
HWBs 
 
Service-users, carers 
and their 
representatives 
 
Those to whom services 
are provided or may be 
provided 
 
Professional expertise 
 
CCGs affected; 
Healthwatch England; 
HWB; relevant local 
authorities 
 
Those to whom services 
are provided or may be 
provided 
 
Board members, but 
meetings are publicly 
accessible 
 
Appropriate persons 
Not specified 
 
 
 
HWB to provide CCG 
and NHS England with 
opinion on the matter 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
Non-reporting activities governed by HSCA 2012, ss 23 (inserting ss 13Q(2), 13R(4) and 13Z(2) of the NHSA 2006), 25 (inserting ss 14F(4), 26 
(inserting ss 14U(1), 14Z2(2), 14Z13(1)–(6), 14W(1), 14Z(8),14Z15(6), 14Z16(4) and 14Z22(1) of the NHSA 2006), 26 (inserting ss 14Z8(3) and s 
14Z13(2)–(6) of the NHSA 2006), 192 (inserting s 116(8A) of the LGPIHA 2007), 193 (inserting s 116A(5) of the LGPIHA 2007), and Schedule 5, 
para. 7(b) (inserting Schedule, para. 1(fa) of the PB(ATM)A 1960). CCG, Clinical Commissioning Groups; HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; HWB, 
Health and Wellbeing Board; NHS, National Health Service; NHSA, National Health Service Act; PB(ATM)A, Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) 
Act.  
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Table 13 Non-reporting activities (health care provision and economic regulation) 
Body Format Substance Addressee Engagement 
opportunity 
NHS Foundation 
Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monitor 
Meeting of 
members 
 
 
Meeting of 
Directors 
 
 
CoG meeting, 
held annually or 
more 
 
Meeting 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
Present annual report, 
accounts, auditor reports; 
voting; accountability  
 
Matters relating to Foundation 
Trust management 
 
 
Annual report; accounts; auditor 
reports  
 
 
Economic regulation (meetings 
closed to the public if substance 
is confidential or prejudicial to 
the public interest) 
 
National Tariff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imposition of financial levies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Producing or revising 
publishable guidance for the 
imposition of discretionary 
requirement and enforcement 
undertakings 
Foundation Trust members, but meetings are 
publicly accessible (members of the public may 
be refused access for ‘special reasons’) 
 
Board of Directors, but meetings publicly 
accessible. The Trust’s constitution may 
exclude the public for special reasons 
 
CoG members 
 
 
 
Monitor Board members, but meetings are 
publicly accessible 
 
 
 
CCG; relevant provider, appropriate persons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NHS England; potentially liable providers; SoS; 
appropriate persons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appropriate persons 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Monitor may not 
publish the 
national tariff if 
CCGs and 
relevant 
providers object 
and percentage 
of objection 
below prescribed 
percentage 
 
Monitor may not 
give notice of 
levies if 
potentially liable 
providers object 
and percentage 
of objection 
below prescribed 
percentage 
 
Not specified 
Non-reporting activities in the area of health care provision governed by HSCA 2012, ss 152(5) (inserting s 18E(1) and (2) NHSA 2006) and 157 
(inserting paras. 27A and 28 of the NHSA 2006). Non-reporting activities in the area of economic regulation are governed by HSCA 2012, ss 108(3), 
118(13), 120(1)–(3); 141(7), 142(1)–(3) and Schedule 13, para. 2 (inserting Schedule, para. 1(bk) of the PB(ATM)A 1960; NHSA 2006, Schedule 7, 
para. 13(2)). CCG, Clinical Commissioning Groups; CQC, Care Quality Commission; HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; NHS, National Health 
Service; PB(ATM)A, Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act; SoS, Secretary of State. 
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Table 14 Non-reporting activities (consumer championing) 
Body Format Substance Addressee Engagement 
opportunity 
Healthwatch 
England 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LHOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistance, advice 
and provision of 
information 
 
Advice and 
assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meetings 
 
 
 
 
Advice, assistance, 
and information; 
recommendations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meetings 
 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
Views of: service user/public needs 
and experiences; improving 
standards 
 
Contractual arrangements; the 
carrying-on of LHO activities to: 
promote and support involvement of 
local people in commissioning, 
provision and scrutiny; enable people 
to monitor and review access to local 
services, choices relating to them and 
standards; make the views and 
experiences of local people known; 
produce reports about how services 
can be improved; provide advice and 
information about access to services 
and choices; recommend special 
reviews and investigation 
 
Consumer championing (meetings 
closed to the public if substance is 
confidential or prejudicial to the public 
interest) 
 
To promote and support involvement 
of local people in commissioning, 
provision and scrutiny; enable people 
to monitor and review access to local 
services, choices relating to them and 
standards; make the views and 
experiences of local people known; 
produce reports about how services 
can be improved; provide advice and 
information about access to services 
and choices; recommend special 
reviews and investigation 
 
Health care and treatment quality 
(meetings closed to the public if 
substance is confidential or 
prejudicial to the public interest  
 
Improvements in local health care 
services; service investigations 
SoS; Monitor; local authorities; 
NHS England; CQC 
 
 
LHOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CQC and Healthwatch England 
Committee members, but 
meetings are publicly 
accessible 
 
Healthwatch England; 
commissioners; local care 
services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LHO members, but meetings 
are publicly accessible 
 
 
 
Healthwatch England 
Respond to 
Healthwatch England 
in writing 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Healthwatch England 
to advise SoS, Monitor, 
NHS England, CQC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
Non-reporting activities governed by: LGPIHA 2007, ss 221(2) and 222; HSCA 2012, ss 181(2) inserting Schedule 1, para. 6(1A) and (1B) of the 
HSCA 2008, 181(4) inserting s 45A(2) of the HSCA 2008; and HSCA 2012, ss 182(4) inserting s 45A of the HSCA 2008 and s 221(2)(e)–(i) of the 
LGPIHA 2007 and 45C(14) of the HSCA 2008, 181(14) and 189(1) inserting Schedule, para. 1(bl) of the PB(ATM)A 1960. CCG, Clinical 
Commissioning Groups; CQC, Care Quality Commission; HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; LHOs, Local Healthwatch Organisations; LGPIHA, 
Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act; NHS, National Health Service; NHSA, National Health Service Act; PB(ATM)A, Public 
Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act.  
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Table 15 Non-reporting activities (health care quality regulation) 
Body Format Substance Addressee Engagement 
opportunity 
CQC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
 
Meetings 
 
 
 
Consultation 
 
 
Advice or guidance 
 
 
Advice and 
information 
concerning 
guidance directed 
by NHS England 
 
Consultation
+ 
How the Commission will, among service users: 
promote awareness of its functions; engage in 
discussion about provision; have regard to the views 
of service users; and arrange for any of its functions 
to be carried out by service users; regulations of 
regulated activities 
 
Guidance issued concerning the control of infectious 
diseases 
 
Drafting guidance on compliance with those 
requirements imposed by the Secretary of State to 
secure the avoidance of harm in relation to regulated 
activities 
 
Indicators on performance assessment, prior to 
publication 
 
Drafting the code of practice on handling confidential 
personal information; draft document on special 
reviews and investigations 
 
 
Issuing guidance in relation to enforcement action; 
inspection framework and programmes 
 
 
 
Health care quality (meetings closed to the public if 
substance is confidential or prejudicial to the public 
interest) 
 
Preparation of, and 
establishing procedures for, quality standards 
 
Quality matters 
 
 
Preparation of commissioning guidance; NICE must 
also disseminate commissioning guidance in manner 
specified in a request 
 
 
 
Procedure for giving advice, guidance, information 
and recommendations 
Persons the Commission 
considers appropriate  
 
 
 
 
 
Persons the Commission 
considers appropriate  
 
Persons the Commission 
considers appropriate  
 
 
 
SoS; persons the Commission 
considers appropriate  
 
SoS; NHS England; a person 
specified by Order; Persons 
the Commission considers 
appropriate  
 
Appropriate persons; 
prescribed persons; 
SoS, inspectors, person 
specified by Order 
 
CQC members, but meetings 
are publicly accessible 
 
 
Members of the public; 
appropriate persons 
 
SoS; NHS England 
 
 
NHS England; such persons 
as may be specified in a 
request  
 
 
 
NHS England 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
+Duties which may be conferred by Secretary of State (SoS) or NHS England in future regulations. 
Non-reporting activities governed by: HSCA 2008, ss 5(3), 20, 23, 24(1), 46(7), 80(3), 81(2), 88(4) and Schedule 4, para. 5(2) and Schedule 5, para. 
55(b) inserting Schedule, para 1(bj) of the PB(ATM)A 1960; and HSCA 2012, ss 234(3), 236(1), 237(7) and 241(3). CAG, Comptroller and Auditor 
General; CQC, Care Quality Commission; HSCA, Health and Social Care Act; Local Healthwatch Organisations; NHS, National Health Service; 
NICE, National Institute of Health and Care Excellence; PB(ATM)A, Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act; SoS, Secretary of State. 
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